Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs
Sovereignty, Order and Conflict present
How to Prevent Coups d’Etat
Why are some rulers able to head off challenges to their rule from their own armed forces, while others are not? How to Prevent Coups d’état argues that part of the answer lies in the ways in which rulers organize and use their coercive institutions. Where rulers counterbalance the military with presidential guards, militarized police, and militia, efforts to oust them from power are less likely to succeed. At the same time, however, this strategy can generate resentment within the military that ends up provoking new coup attempts. Drawing on an original dataset of coercive institutions in 110 countries over a span of fifty years, as well as case studies of coup attempts in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the book sheds light on whether and how rulers can make their regimes impervious to coups. It shows that while counterbalancing may prevent successful coup attempts, it is a risky strategy to pursue—and one that may weaken regimes in the long term.
Erica De Bruin
Erica De Bruin is an Associate Professor of Government at Hamilton College, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Her research focuses on civil-military relations, civil war, and militarized policing. She is the author of How to Prevent Coups d’état: Counterbalancing and Regime Survival (Cornell University Press). Her research has also been published in the Journal of Peace Research and Journal of Conflict Resolution. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University, and a B.A. from Columbia University.
This event was first published on August 18, 2021 and last updated on September 20, 2021.