SU Graduate Philosophy Conference

Please join us for the SU Graduate Philosophy Conference, held each year by the Syracuse University Department of Philosophy.

The conference consists of five talks by invited graduate student speakers. In addition, there will be two keynote speakers: Martín Abreu Zavaleta of Syracuse University and Rima Basu (pictured) of Claremont McKenna College.

Internal Keynote Speech: “Only wholes, but also their parts”
Martín Abreu Zavaleta (Syracuse University)
6 to 8 p.m., March 21
Abstract
We have an apple, an orange and a box. If the apple is in the box, then at least some of the apple’s parts are in the box. But the apple’s parts are distinct from the apple itself. So if the apple is in the box, then there are at least two things in the box: the apple and at least one of its parts. So it can’t be that only the apple is in the box. In this talk, I use a scalar analysis of “only” to explain what goes wrong with this specious reasoning: one can’t infer that not only x is F from the fact that at least two things are F. Along the way, I argue that standard diagnoses of the problem using domain restriction are mistaken and that, contrary to most recent literature, “only” doesn’t interact with contextually available information in a way that would help with the puzzle.

External Keynote Speech: “Ignorance as Epistemic Etiquette”
Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College)
4 to 6 p.m., March 22
Abstract
To call someone ignorant is to insult them. It is not surprising then that much of the philosophical literature on ignorance has focused on its harms. In this paper, I argue that there are morally laudable cases of ignorance qua ignorance. Ignorance, as a kind of epistemic etiquette, protects inquiry from turning into an inquisition, questioning from turning into prying. When we indulge in overcuriosity we risk a range of inquisitive wrongs, we risk failing to give others the respect they are owed not just in how we act towards them, but also in how they figure in our inquiries. Two complications arise, however, in determining how to understand ignorance as epistemic etiquette. First, many examples of hermeneutical injustice rely on the disadvantaged not questioning the status quo, of not being curious. Second, to determine whether one should be ignorant about p may require inquiring into p in the first place. Despite these challenges, I posit epistemic etiquette as a promising resource for distinguishing one class of morally permissible ignorance.