SU Graduate Philosophy Conference

Stephanie Leary (McGill University)

Please join us for the SU Graduate Philosophy Conference, held each year by the Syracuse University Department of Philosophy.

The conference consists of five talks by invited graduate student speakers. In addition, there will be two keynote speakers: Josh Hunt of Syracuse University and Stephanie Leary of McGill University.

Internal Keynote Speech: “What Are We Doing When We Do Philosophy?”

Abstract:

Philosophers commonly accuse their opponents of failing to provide satisfactory answers to philosophical questions. We claim that our preferred positions have advantages, while our opponents’ have costs. Certain views are seen as owing us an explanation, lest they posit an “unexplanatory” brute fact or an “ad hoc” connection. What are we doing when we make these types of evaluative and normative claims? After noting that “explanation” is problematically polysemous, I will consider two cases. In Case 1, reality settles the truth of these evaluative and normative claims: some philosophical positions really do “owe us an explanation.” In Case 2, reality does not settle the truth of these claims. I will argue that even if we are in Case 2, we can vindicate the rationality of philosophy. Philosophers are at least engaged in a collective enterprise to alleviate intellectual puzzlement. On the picture of philosophy I propose, philosophy can be “many-things go” without being “anything goes.” Accordingly, intractable philosophical disagreement is to be welcomed rather than scorned. My hope is that many audience members will strongly disagree with my proposal in Q&A.

External Keynote Speech: “The Applied Moral Turn of the Ethics of Belief Debate”

Abstract:

The pragmatism—anti-pragmatism debate is about whether practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for or against belief. Parties to this debate have traditionally focused on cases in which someone’s believing some proposition would benefit or harm them—the believer—in some way. But recently the literature has taken a moral, and more applied turn, focusing on real-world issues like racial profiling and sexual assault accusations and asking whether sometimes our beliefs themselves, independently of how we act on them, can wrong others. My aim is to clarify the extent to which this turn of focus is useful for the pragmatism—anti-pragmatism debate. I argue that focusing on the question of whether our beliefs themselves can wrong others is not useful because it’s irrelevant to the central question in debate. But I argue that focusing on applied, moral issues is useful because it sheds light on an underlying issue in the debate—whether we can believe for practical considerations.